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The term “network” has become a dominant trope in studies of contemporary capitalism, 
used to explain what distinguishes advanced capitalism from its industrial predecessors 
(DiMaggio 2002).  Capitalist workplaces are alleged to be more egalitarian with more 
lateral and fewer hierarchical ties than their more bureaucratic ancestors.   Companies are 
said to collaborate to a greater degree, their ties characterized more by the fluidity and 
give-and-take of social relationships than by the fixity and formality of arms-length con-
tractual agreements.   Consumers purchase goods as much for their ego-congruence as for 
their instrumental utility, bolstering identities negotiated in social interaction rather than 
through fixed and formal statuses.   The global economy itself is portrayed as a vast net-
work of exchanges that crisscross national boundaries, leaving states powerless to control 
them.   It is clear that students of capitalism have found networks “good to think with,” in 
Mary Douglas’s phrase (1979: 40), a powerful metaphor for capturing the fluidity and 
reach of economic relations.  Indeed, the most ambitious effort to characterize contemp-
orary capitalism, Manuel Castells (1996) characterizes the dominant contemporary social 
formation as “the network society.”  
  In this paper, we focus on two more concrete and specific ways in which net-
works figure into the practice and study of contemporary capitalism.   The first is as con-
crete technology.   Communications networks are the vehicles through which information 
flows, and for the past century, information and the services used to communicate it have DiMaggio and Cohen ---2--- 
become ever larger components of capitalist production and distribution, roughly doub-
ling (with nontrivial disagreements resting on definitional issues) in the advanced econ-
omies during the last half of the 20
th century (Machlup 1962; Porat 1977; Rubin and 
Huber 1986; Castells 1996).  Global telecommunications networks did not cause the 
changes in capitalist workplaces noted above, but they clearly facilitated them (Castells 
2001).   Mobile telecommunications increase both the ease with which employees can 
share information and solve problems across departmental lines and the costs to firms 
that insist on maintaining hierarchical lines of communication.   New kinds of manage-
ment information systems permit firms to coordinate their activities in real time by mak-
ing data on production schedules and inventories immediately accessible to both partners.   
The Internet places an immense range of products within the grasp of anyone with suffic-
ient income, facilitating new levels of stylistic differentiation and enabling middle-class 
consumers to reinvent themselves with props from around the world.  And global 
communications networks undergird the transborder flows of money and data upon 
which the world economy has come to depend.   In this sense, then, “network” as trope 
rests on “network” as literal technology. 
Second, we employ “network” as a theoretical construct, drawing on economic 
theories of “network goods” and services.   Network goods and services are those that ex-
hibit “network externalities”: that is, their value to adopters increases as a function of the 
number of other people who use them.   Such technologies have increased in number and 
importance over the past century, as people’s consumption decisions and opportunities 
have become more interdependent.   We draw on the work of economists to understand 
patterns of technology diffusion, and expand upon it by suggesting that the concept DiMaggio and Cohen ---3--- 
should be understood more broadly to include social, as well as individually instrumental, 
utilities.   
  Our interest in these topics was stimulated by the senior author’s research on in-
equality in access to and use of the Internet in the United States, and therefore we focus 
on that technology in much of this paper.   Once one documents inequality in access to a 
relatively new technology, it becomes imperative to understand the trajectory along 
which that technology is diffusing.  Without a model of the diffusion process, one has no 
way of knowing whether a given level of inequality represents a long-term policy chal-
lenge or a temporary inconvenience.   Thinking about the Internet leads one to ask what 
general factors account for group-specific patterns of technology adoption.   This line of 
questioning that led us both to the notion of “network externalities” and to the explorat-
ory analysis, comparing of the early diffusion trajectories of television and the Internet, 
with which we conclude this paper.    
 We have three goals for this paper.   First, we want to bring the economic con-
struct of network externalities into sociological analysis of technological inequality, 
while at the same time inflecting it sociologically.   Second, we will sketch a comparative 
model explaining variation in the diffusion patterns of different communications technol-
ogies, in order to place the Internet case in a broader theoretical and empirical context.   
Third, we present findings from a comparative analysis of household adoption of televis-
ion from 1948 to 1957 and the Internet from 1994 to 2002 that cast light on the extent to 
which intergroup inequality in Internet access is likely to persist as the diffusion process 
continues.    
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Social Inequality and Internet Access, 1994-2003 
 
Social scientists recognize that information plays a crucial role in processes that generate 
social inequality.  Measures of “aptitude” or “achievement” (which serve as proxies for 
generalized information or for the capacity to acquire information) are staples of work in 
educational attainment.  Studies of the impact of networks on career advancement (Gran-
ovetter 1974; Burt 1992) and consumer purchases (DiMaggio and Louch 1996) emphas-
ize the role that interpersonal relationships play in the acquisition of market information.  
It stands to reason that if information is important, then command of technologies  that 
provide access to information or facilitate communication (telephones, fax machines, 
television sets, computer modems) must help people get ahead.  Yet with few exceptions 
(Attewell 2001; Autor, Katz and Krueger 1998), neither sociologists nor economists have 
studied systematically the relationship between life chances, on the one hand, and access 
to information technology and the ability to use it, on the other. 
  The Internet, which occupied such a large space in America’s consciousness dur-
ing the technology boom of the 1990s, began to change this situation.   By appearing to 
reduce the marginal cost of information and communications nearly to zero, the Internet 
and World Wide Web inspired extravagant claims that a new age of information equality 
was dawning.  Now everyone, the Web’s advocates claimed, could have access to the 
best information about health, the means to participate fully in the polity, wide-ranging 
information about job opportunities, and other advantages formerly restricted to the well 
to do or well educated.  Because people can benefit from the Internet’s offerings only if 
they can go on-line, it was natural for policy makers to worry about, and social scientists DiMaggio and Cohen ---5--- 
to study, the “digital divide,” as inequality in access to this new technology came to be 
called. 
  The basic dimensions of the digital divide are well known (DiMaggio et al. 2004).   
In the United States, having a college education, a high income, “white” racial identific-
ation, and youth all raise the odds of having Internet access.   In 2001, among Americans 
aged 18 or older, just 26 percent of African-Americans compared to 47 percent of every-
one else could go on-line from home.  So could more than two of three college graduates, 
but just 43 percent of high school graduates who had not gone on to college.   Americans 
with family incomes greater than $67,500 were twice as likely to live in homes with In-
ternet service as those with incomes from $20,000 to $30,0000; and people aged eighteen 
to twenty-five were twice as likely to have such service as persons older than fifty-five 
(DiMaggio et al. 2004, Table 1).    
Policy analysts and communications experts agree that these differences exist but 
quarrel over what they mean.  The problem is this: At any point in a diffusion process, in-
tergroup inequalities reflect distinctive diffusion processes for particular population sub-
groups.   If groups are traveling along the same path, but have started at different points 
and are proceeding at different speeds, different adoption rates simply reflect the shape of 
the diffusion curve and the groups’ relative progress toward a common destination.  If 
their trajectories are radically different, disadvantages may persist indefinitely. 
Most diffusion processes are roughly S-shaped, with a long and gradual build-up 
period followed by a rapid ascent after which growth levels off.   For technologies that 
are eventually adopted universally (or nearly so), absolute differences in penetration rates 
between more and less advantaged groups tend to be modest during the build-up phase, DiMaggio and Cohen ---6--- 
spiral upward during early takeoff phase, and diminish rapidly once the less advantaged 
group has also entered take-off and the rate of increase of the more advantaged group has 
slowed.   The global diffusion rate for a given society, of course, represents the aggregate 
of these different group-specific trajectories. 
Between 1994 and 2001 (the last year of Current Population Survey data available 
to us), different intergroup disparities followed differing paths.  Gender inequality in In-
ternet access, significant in the mid-1990s, largely disappeared; and place of residence 
likewise became less important.  By contrast, inequality in access on the basis of race, 
educational attainment, and income remained substantial (DiMaggio et al. 2004).   
There are many reasons for the persistence of intergroup differences, not the least 
of which is their mutually reinforcing character due to correlations among education, in-
come and race.   The underlying process generating these differences is one of individual 
choice under institutional constraint.   Institutional factors loom large because of unequal 
access to schools and jobs that provide access to and training in new technologies, uneq-
ual investments in neighborhood libraries or community technology centers, and unequal 
access to high-speed Internet service based on place of residence.   Many, although not 
all, of these institutional factors tend to raise the effective cost of Internet access (in time 
or money) to precisely those people – low-income persons with relatively little education 
– who have fewer resources to invest in information technology in the first place.   Indiv-
idual choice is also crucial, especially for household Internet service, because, except in 
those rare cases where a resident’s employer provides it, at least one household member 
must invest in a service contract.       DiMaggio and Cohen ---7--- 
Individual choices to invest in communications technologies and related goods 
and services are systematically different than choices to purchase many other kinds of 
goods and services.   Most goods are “rival”:  If I consume them there will be fewer left 
for you.   Consumption of many other services is competitive: purchasing more or better 
education offers advantages to me only if you decline to do the same.   By contrast, com-
unications technologies tend to have what economists refer to as “network properties,” 
whereby my purchase of a good or service may increase its value to you.   Indeed, one 
can argue that an important feature of contemporary capitalism is the increasing econom-
ic and social prevalence and importance of goods and services with “network externalit-
ies” relative to earlier market economies.   In order to understand the factors influencing 
inequality in access to the Internet, then, it is necessary to understand a little about goods 
and services of this kind. 
Network Externalities, Technical and Social 
A product or service possesses network externalities if the utility one derives from it is a 
positive function of the number of other people who consume it.
1   For example, a tele-
phone is of little value if no one else is using it; of moderate value if only a few of one’s 
potential contacts use it; and indispensable if everyone uses it.   Most communications 
technologies are network goods in this sense: They literally constitute a network, and the 
value of the network depends on the number of persons (or organizations or other entit-
ies) connected to it (Shy 2000; Varian 1999).    
Earlier communications technologies typically came in the form of goods (news-
papers, books, magazines) or services (performing-arts events, the conveyance of tele-
graph messages).   By contrast, modern communications technologies typically combine DiMaggio and Cohen ---8--- 
a product (a radio, a telephone, fax machine, television set, computer, or piece of soft-
ware) and a service (broadcast programming, telephone service, fax transmission, or 
Internet access).  Also typically, the real money is in selling the service (which produces 
an ongoing revenue stream) rather than the product (which is usually a one-shot purch-
ase); and the value of the service derives from the number of persons on-line, which is to 
say the positive network externalities.  Often these externalities are direct: The value of 
e-mail to me depends on how many of my friends I can reach through it.  The value of 
Kazaa to its users depends on how many other users make their own MP3 collections ac-
cessible through it.   The more people participate in E-Bay auctions, the more attractive 
the merchandise and the more spirited the bidding.  Positive network externalities may 
also be indirect, i.e. based on role complementarity.   The more people who watch a net-
work television program; the more advertisers will compete to buy commercial time on 
it; the more people who put Acrobat Reader on their computer, the more likely are people 
who want to share documents to buy the full software package; the more consumers join 
Pay Pal, the more merchants will give Pay Pal a cut of their revenue for mediating trans-
actions.  Such complementary network externalities often redound to the benefit of non-
paying consumers (in the form, for example, of more lavishly produced television shows, 
more accessible manuscripts, or easier on-line shopping).   
  This feature of information technologies (that they simultaneously comprise pro-
ducts and services, and that these services entail significant network externalities) pro-
duces a distinctive form of business strategy: subsidization of some forms of consumpt-
ion in order to build networks large enough to sustain particularly profitable revenue 
streams.  Thus IBM shared its operating system with software makers in the 1980s, tele-DiMaggio and Cohen ---9--- 
phone companies practically give away cell phones to new subscribers, and you can 
download Netscape or Acrobat Reader software for free.   (Where producers are unable 
to charge continuing fees for services, they may take the opposite approach.   Thus in the 
1920s, producers of radio equipment subsidized radio programming in order to sell more 
radio sets [Douglas 1987: 299-300].)  
Social Network Externalities 
So far we have been talking about material or market externalities, where the rewards to 
network expansion are of tangible utility to consumers, service providers, and/or advert-
isers.   From a sociological perspective, there are other, equally important, forms of net-
work externalities, both negative and positive, which may also play a role in the diffusion 
of  new technologies.  We define an externality as social when the size or composition of 
the market for a good or service influences the value of consumption of that good or ser-
vice as an input into an individual production function, the output of which is social 
identity.  We discuss briefly three simple and familiar kinds of social network externality.   
(1) Societal membership as a network externality.  People need certain goods or 
services to be full-fledged members of their community (Rainwater 1974).   Within any 
community, there are reasonably well-established expectations about what bona fide 
members owe one another in terms of both availability and knowledgability.   The spread 
of communications and information technologies extended the scope and changed the 
nature of such claims.   With respect to availability, Americans, for example, are expect-
ed to be reachable by telephone.  Individuals without telephone service occupy a kind of 
social and labor-market limbo.  (Within the academic community, failure to use e-mail DiMaggio and Cohen ---10--- 
came to be perceived as a lamentable abdication of citizenship obligations at some point 
during the early 1990s.)   
With respect to information, the emergence of mass communications placed a 
premium on certain kinds of baseline knowledge, which became the stuff of everyday 
conversation.  In the contemporary United States, knowledge of this kind is occasionally 
political --- Americans expect one another to have opinions about presidential candidates, 
and to be able to identify such figures as Arnold Schwarzenegger and Osama Bin Ladin.   
More often, however, such information concerns popular forms of entertainment like 
“The Simpsons,” “Seinfeld,” “South Park” or “Sesame Street.”   As Horace Newcomb 
and Paul Hirsch (1983) and W. Russell Neuman (1991) have noted, television has played 
a key role as a source of such socially expected information since the 1950s, a role to 
which it was well-suited during the network era but which the proliferation of cable chan-
nels and satellite services has undermined.  Goods and services that provide such socially 
expected information are an integral medium through which groups convey basic elem-
ents of their shared construction of reality, making connectivity essential if one wants to 
participate in communal discussion and comprehension of the world. 
  Information and communications technologies that are sources of socially man-
dated forms of availability and knowledgability become effectively indispensable.   To 
achieve such social indispensability, technologies must have two properties.   First, they 
must be reasonably attractive and effective.  (The advantages of telephone communicat-
ion became quickly apparent, although economic factors slowed its spread; and television 
beguiled audiences from the start.)  Second, they must be economically affordable (either 
because they require one-shot purchases like television sets, or because minimal service DiMaggio and Cohen ---11--- 
is kept relatively cheap as a matter of public policy, as is the case for telephone and basic 
cable service in the United States).   If these conditions are present, social-membership 
externalities eventually reach a tipping point at which only the very poor or very eccent-
ric will do without them.   Indeed, near universal diffusion is probably only achieved by 
technologies for which such social-membership externalities are present. 
  Status-group affiliation as a network externality.  By “status group,” I refer to a 
social group united by a shared sense of identity, common status culture, and practices 
that produce internal cohesion and clear boundaries.  Certain forms of communication 
and information technologies are useful in the production of group identities, with their 
utility increasing with the proportion of group members employing the technology.  
(Goods with this type of externality are similar to what economists have called “club” 
goods.)  In some cases, as when Islamic militants in pre-revolutionary Iran used sound 
cassettes as a means of spreading their beliefs because other media were closed to them 
(Manuel 1993), a technology is put to practical use.  This is also the case for virtual 
groups (for example, isolated persons with low-incidence medical conditions or political 
extremists with low-incidence ideologies) that the Internet has brought together and given 
voice.  In other cases, consumption may be more strictly symbolic (e.g., the ubiquitous 
use of transistor radios by U.S. teenagers in the 1960s, of pagers by their urban counter-
parts in the 1980s, or of Internet-equipped cellular devices among contemporary Japanese 
adolescents).  
  Prestige and negative externalities.  Since Veblen (1899), economists have noted 
that consumers pursue certain goods because they bestow social distinction upon their 
possessors.  For such consumers of such goods, the diffusion of a technology or product DiMaggio and Cohen ---12--- 
to additional strata represents a negative externality because it reduces the prestige value 
of consumption.   This can occur when the price falls, when the technology becomes 
simpler, or when producers alter the contents to make it more appealing to a mass aud-
ience.   Negative externalities are relatively rare in information and communications 
technologies, although they can be discerned in the negative response of some techies to 
the commercialization of the Internet or to the rise of mass portals like AOL; in cases in 
which original participants in interactive spaces withdraw when the number of less com-
mitted or less sophisticated users multiplies; or, as we shall see, in the aversion of college 
graduates to television during the 1950s.  Other things equal, prestige hierarchies moder-
ate the slope of adoption curves, as early adopters flee in the face of new entrants.    
  Note that we use the term “network good” more broadly and loosely than do ec-
onomists, who restrict it to what we refer to in Figure 1 as “pure network goods.”  We 
broaden the term in three ways.  First, we identify “social” as well as “instrumental” ex-
ternalities, and suggest that the former may be as important as the latter.   Second, we re-
gard the extent to which a good or service possesses network externalities as a continuous 
variable, rather than viewing network goods and other goods as clearly separable classes.   
Third, we identify two analytically independent dimensions of “networkness” (the degree 
to which goods’ use entails social interaction and the extent to which users care about the 
specific identities of other consumers).
2    
Network Externalities, Social Networks and Technology Diffusion 
Think of diffusion curves as the precipitate of millions of individual choices.   Such 
choice processes can be modeled in the following way (Granovetter and Soong 1983).   
Each potential adopter places a value on the technology, such that she or he will purchase DiMaggio and Cohen ---13--- 
it when its cost falls to her or his reservation price.   Where reservation prices are normal-
ly distributed and scale economies apply, we get the familiar S-curve.  Each new wave of 
adoption reduces the cost a little bit, so that it reaches the level at which new consumers 
will sign on.  (Because reservation prices are normally distributed it does this at an in-
creasing rate, generating a slow uptake followed by a rapid ascent.)   Where reservation 
prices are clumpy or scale economies weak, the process may be arrested early on, so that 
only a small proportion of the potential market ever adopts.    
We expect network externalities to generate the S-curve in a similar, but exagger-
ated way, due to the interaction of two mutually reinforcing processes.   First, prices de-
cline due to economies of scale.  Second, at the same time, the value that potential con-
sumers place on the good -- and therefore their reservation prices – rises at the same time, 
as more people adopt.   This combination of scale-economy dynamics and ascending res-
ervation prices can yield explosive patterns of growth, similar to the increase in Internet 
usage in the U.S. between 1995 and 2000.    
Not all network externalities have the same implications for diffusion processes, 
however.  Although all network externalities lead users to benefit as a function of the ov-
erall size of the user population, they vary along two key, correlated dimensions (see Fig-
ure 1):  First, to what extent does use of the technology entail direct interaction with other 
users?  Second, to what extent do users care who else is using the technology?   The two 
are correlated: In general, we care about the identities of technology users more if we use 
the technology to interact with them.   We sign on to an instant messaging service not be-
cause lots of other people do but because our friends or family members use it.   We 
download Adobe Acrobat Reader because we believe that the particular people who use DiMaggio and Cohen ---14--- 
Acrobat Writer will produce .pdf files that we will want to read.   In these cases, adoption 
by many users raises our reservation price only slightly, but adoption by a few particular 
users may increase it significantly.   So network externalities are strongest, and the dyn-
amics associated with them particularly intense, in the bottom right region of the Figure 
1, where both identity specificity and intensity of interaction are high. 
When we neither care about the identities of other technology users nor interact 
with them, network externalities are weak --- so weak that economists do not even con-
sider such technologies to be network goods.  Rather, they use the term “scale econom-
ies” to refer to benefits conferred upon producers by third parties (for example, vendors 
who reduce prices, or advertisers who pay more for airtime), some fraction of which are 
passed on to consumers in the form of lower prices or higher quality (in response to 
which potential adopters may raise their reservation prices). 
  The correlation is not perfect, however.  The mass media have social-member-
ship externalities that enable us to refer to media content in interaction with many other 
people. But we do not care (or at least not very much) who else is watching Seinfeld re-
runs, the Emmy Awards show, or the Olympics.   Rather we value the fact that we can 
make conversation about such media content with almost anyone we happen to meet.    
On the other hand, people who use commodities for status display may care deep-
ly that the right kind of people have adopted a given product (e.g., a Movado watch or an 
expensive brand of Scotch) even though it is only rarely a focus of interaction.  Technol-
ogies like cable television that require local infrastructure also inhabit the upper right 
quadrant, but for a quite different reason: because of physical constraints, distribution DiMaggio and Cohen ---15--- 
markets are localized, and other people’s adoption will only enhance the availability and 
quality of my service if those other adopters occupy the same service area as I do.   
 
Why network externalities make a difference to technology adoption.  Network 
externalities are important for technology diffusion because they make adoption decisions 
interdependent.   This in turn means that the structure of social networks – in particular, 
density, homophily, and the location and availability of “bridges” connecting networks 
comprising people of different kinds (Rogers 2003: 306; Watt 1999) -- will have import-
ant implications for adoption rates in general, and for intergroup inequalities in particular.   
Network structures interact with the types of externalities illustrated in Figure 1.   Each 
location in Figure 1 mandates a characteristic pattern of diffusion, other things equal.  
Figure 1.  Types of Network Externalities 
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The further to the right on the x axis (identity specificity), the more adoption will be 
bound by the contours of social networks, and tend to occur one network region at a time.  
(This is because my reservation price becomes lower not when anyone adopts, but only 
when someone in my own social circle comes on board.)   The further to the left on the x 
axis, the more adoption will be driven by individual convenience and exposure to market-
ing.   The y axis refers primarily to the rate at which adoption information circulates – 
quickly at the bottom, where the technology is a focus of interaction, more slowly at the 
top --- and therefore largely influences the rate at which the process proceeds.   
True network goods – that is, those that are high in interactivity and identity spec-
ificity – are likely to have distinctive growth profiles, based on the island-like quality of 
group-specific diffusion processes (where “group” refers to a relatively highly bounded 
social network).  Adoption proceeds slowly within each network region until reaching a 
tipping point after which network members find the new technology indispensable.   De-
pending upon the number and shape of bridges across network regions, adoption will cas-
cade from one network region to another, as “bridges” (persons connected to others in 
each network area) act as seeds for new adoption processes.   
What does this have to do with intergroup inequality in access to the Internet?  
First, the Internet is a network service par excellence – or rather it is a technology that 
includes a range of network services (e-mail, instant messaging, interactive discussion 
groups, file-sharing software), in addition to some services with weaker network extern-
alities (e.g. on-line shopping, downloading IRS forms).   It seems likely that most adopt-
ion to this point has been driven more by the former than by the latter.   DiMaggio and Cohen ---17--- 
Second,  due to social homophily (the tendency of people to interact most heavily 
with people like themselves) the network regions in which adoption gestates and across 
which diffusion cascades are often characterized by substantial homogeneity with respect 
to such things as educational attainment, income, and race.   Although a formal develop-
ment of these ideas is beyond this chapter’s scope, intuitively it seems likely that, ceteris 
paribus, the rate at which initially disadvantaged groups catch up with initially advant-
aged groups will depend not simply on the economic resources they command, but also 
on the homogeneity of the social networks in which they participate.  Where social isolat-
ion of outgroups is high, members of initially low-adopting social categories may have 
little reason to adopt a network technology.   Where interaction across categorical bound-
aries is high, one would expect intergroup disparities to be only temporary.   The fact that 
differences in Internet access related to race and educational attainment, for example, 
have shown little sign of abating is consistent with research demonstrating high levels of 
network homophily with respect to these very characteristics (Marsden 1987).  
Towards a Comparative Model of Technology Diffusion 
The strength and nature of network externalities is only one of the factors that influence  
patterns of technology diffusion and the extent and tenacity of intergroup inequality in 
adoption.   In this section we take an inventory of consequential conditions. 
One set of influences is technological.   Diffusion rates are shaped by the devel-
opment and location of infrastructure necessary to sustain individual or household use 
(e.g., local broadcasters for television, broadband connections for streaming video).   In 
the early years of television, the major constraint on adoption was whether one lived 
close enough to a broadcast station to receive the signal.   In the early years of high-speed DiMaggio and Cohen ---18--- 
Internet service, major constraints have included the distance of one’s home from one’s 
ISP and the age of the local cable system (for DSL and cable, respectively). 
Purely economic influences also come into play.   Cost significantly constrains 
adoption, especially early in the diffusion process before significant scale economies 
have been achieved.   Equally important is the distinction between one-time purchases 
(like television sets) and services (like telecommunications) that require monthly fees.   
Even expensive consumer items often become widely available at low prices once scale 
economies are reached and secondary markets develop.   By contrast, monthly service 
fees place ongoing pressure on household budgets.   
A third set of influences reflect the technology’s fit with existing knowledge and 
practice, and the extent to which potential consumers can assimilate it to routines of 
everyday life.  Historians have demonstrated that new technologies ordinarily shape 
themselves to the contours of existing practices, affording opportunities more than af-
fecting behavior [Agre 1998]).   In the short run, at least, technologies that are simple to 
use and reinforce familiar behavior patterns will diffuse more quickly than those that are 
difficult to use or require users to change their habits. 
A fourth set of influences reflects the versatility of the technology.  By versatility, 
we refer, first, to the number of uses to which the technology can be put; and, second, for 
information technologies, to the diversity of content that one can find on it.   Other things 
equal, there will be greater demand for technologies that can be put to many uses.   The 
greater the content diversity, the more similarly will members of different identity groups 
value the technology.   DiMaggio and Cohen ---19--- 
A final set of influences are institutional: first, strategies of the business enter-
prises that develop and distribute the technology and, second, policies of government.   
Business strategies enhance diffusion rates and reduce intergroup differences when firms 
subsidize initial adoption.   They are likely to do this when programming is paid for by 
third parties (for example, when audience size augments advertising revenue) or when 
adopters must make  recurrent purchases (for example, ink cartridges for printers).  Bus-
inesses are more likely to cultivate small, segmented markets insofar as consumption en-
tails negative externalities (for example, snob appeal or information of competitive value 
for which a few purchasers will pay a great deal).   Government may stimulate a technol-
ogy’s development by subsidizing capital costs (which increases diffusion rates, but does 
not reduce intergroup differences).  Or government may seek to reduce intergroup ine-
quality by subsidizing (or mandating the subsidization) of adoption for groups based on 
income (e.g., policies that aim to keep the cost of local basic telephone or cable service 
low) or life-cycle stage (e.g., technology grants to public schools or senior centers).    
Each of these sources of variation has different implications for inequality in ac-
cess.  (See Table 1.)   Cost shapes inequality with respect to income (and characteristics 
or identities that are correlated with income).  Infrastructure availability shapes inequality 
by place of residence (rural areas ordinarily have less well-developed communications 
infrastructures than urban places) and may make income more important (e.g., if the well-
off can compensate for locational disadvantage through spending, as when prosperous 
rural dwellers purchase high-speed, high-cost Internet connections using satellite dishes).  
When users require knowledge or skill to make a technology useful, we are likely to see 
more inequality with respect to formal education (with more educated people better able DiMaggio and Cohen ---20--- 
to learn how to use the technology) and age (with younger people more likely to receive 
training in school or at work).   Versatility should dampen intergroup differences and 
(other things equal) increase the rate of adoption.  Versatility may also shape the compet-
itive challenges facing innovators, with versatile technologies capable of competing on a 
number of fronts and avoiding direct competition with powerful existing media.   Busin-
ess strategies or government policies that affect the costs and benefits of different con-
sumer groups differentially may exacerbate or moderate inequality. 
It follows from the heterogeneity of factors affecting adoption, and the differing 
position of groups with respect to these factors, that inequality based on different individ-
ual characteristics may vary sharply over the course of the diffusion process, with some 
groups attaining advantages early on that they lose thereafter (Bonus 1973; Van den 
Bulte & Lilien 2001: 1411).   We have already described the influence of network extern-
alities on diffusion processes, and their dependence on the structure of subcommunity  
Table 1: Factors Influencing the Rate of and Intergroup Inequality in Information 
Technology Diffusion 
Influencing factor    Implication if high 
 Extent of network externalities 
       Instrumental 
       Social (Membership, Identity, Prestige) 
Exaggerates nonlinearity in adoption pattern; the 
more that externalities are identity-specific, the 
more persistent will intergroup differences be, in 
proportion to the lack of interaction between group 
members, and the more network structure will 
matter 
Location-specificity of distribution technology  Increases urban-rural/ metropolitan-nonmetropolitan 
inequality; often income inequality 
Cost  
       One-time purchase price 
        Is there an ongoing cost? 
The higher the price, the greater the impact of in-
come on adoption. Income especially strong predict-
or of adoption of technologies that require sub-
scriptions or other ongoing expense. 
Complexity 
       Skill requirements 
       Fit to existing routines 
High complexity (in both senses) leads to high 
educational inequality in adoption, and.advantages 
younger adopters. 
Versatility 
       Functional versatility (variety of affordances) 
       Content diversity 
Increases rate of adoption and reduces intergroup 
differences in adoption. Implications for competit-
ion (none, head-on, multiple fronts). 
Institutional policies 
       Business strategies  
       Government policies  
Third-party payments and ongoing expenses lead 
businesses to subsidize adoption.  Government 
subsidies to disadvantaged groups reduce inequality. DiMaggio and Cohen ---21--- 
 
networks and the prevalence of bridges among them.   The impact of residence often 
declines over time as technical infrastructure is built out or delivery technologies become 
more sophisticated and powerful.   The impact of income declines insofar as diffusion is 
accompanied by producers’ exploitation of scale economies.   The effects of education 
and age are likely to decline if technical interfaces become simpler and if new practices 
associated with new technologies become institutionalized and taken for granted. 
These observations constitute an analytic framework and nothing more.   It 
remains to develop these hypotheses through simulation modeling of adoption processes 
and to test such refined hypotheses through appropriate comparisons among individuals, 
technologies and national societies.   In the remainder of this chapter, we illustrate the 
possibilities with a primitive comparison between diffusion patterns in the United States 
for two influential communication technologies: television and the Internet. 
Television and the Internet: An Heuristic Comparison 
Recall that this inquiry began with the following question: Does inequality in access to 
the Internet reflect the differing rates at which different groups are proceeding along a 
single trajectory; or does it represent intractable patterns of disadvantage such that differ-
ent groups will follow fundamentally different trajectories with different outcomes.   Our 
goal, then, is to develop a comparative framework to explain variation in the trajectories 
of different information and communications technologies, including the extent of inter-
group inequality during and at the end of the diffusion process.  In this section, we apply 
the framework developed in the previous sections of this paper to a comparison of tele-
vision and the Internet, focusing on the first decade or so of the market for each. DiMaggio and Cohen ---22--- 
Comparing Television to the Internet 
How do television and the Internet compare on the salient dimensions identified earlier in 
this chapter?   Table 2 summarizes key differences that are posited to influence the rate 
and trajectory of diffusion and the degree and persistence of socioeconomic inequality.   
Externalities. One important difference is that the Internet possesses much strong-
er network externalities than television.  Many of the most popular Internet-based pro-
grams (electronic mail, instant messaging, peer-to-peer networks, auction sites, and var-
ious kinds of interactive spaces) are valuable in proportion to the number of people who 
participate.   Moreover, many of these network externalities have high levels of specif-
icity with respect to the particular persons who participate.   In addition to the pure econ-
omic externalities, there are also important social-identity externalities, as the Internet 
generates new areas of expertise and new materials for the construction and maintenance 
of distinctive identities and status cultures.   The strength of these network externalities 
would lead us to anticipate (other things equal) a slow takeoff and then a rapid diffusion.  
(The strong network character would suggest a very steep upward trajectory, but the fact 
that the affordances that possess strong externalities are relatively loosely coupled [i.e., 
likely to appeal to somewhat different sets of users) would tend to moderate the explosive 
character of growth.)  The high level of network specificity (i.e., the fact that people care 
for many purposes who the other users are) leads us to expect a diffusion process char-
acterized by considerable lumpiness (as different networks join up more or less en masse 
when local tipping points are reached) and persistent intergroup inequality (especially 
among groups with relatively low rates of social interaction).    DiMaggio and Cohen ---23--- 
By contrast, television was characterized by a lower-specificity societal-member-
ship externality, based on the importance to most people of being able to exhibit familiar-
ity with “what everyone is talking about,” as the latter increasingly is defined by what ap-
pears on the television screen.   (Note that although the strength of this factor may have 
declined with the growth of cable channels and the increasing segmentation of the audi-
ence after the mid-1980s [Turow 1997], we are here concerned with the period of net-
work dominance during the 1950s.)   Television also indirect and nonspecific externalit-
ies in the form of scale economies, as increased viewership led to higher advertising rates 
and higher production budgets.   Such externalities should have been adequate to produce  
Table 2: Television vs. Internet: Relevant Similarities and Differences 
  TELEVISION  INTERNET 
Economic 
Externalities 
Indirect: TV ownership (and viewership) 
provides basis for advertising which 
encourages more expensive programming 
and investment in new transmitters and 
local stations 
Direct: many uses including e -mail, 
auctions, peer-to-peer file-sharing, and 
some software 
Indirect: patronage produces advert-
iser support of sites (in theory) 
Social externalities  Strong societal-membership externalities  Group identity  and societal member-
ship 
Location-specificity  Strong regional specificity, weak within-
metropolitan specificity 
Moderate within-region specificity; 
weak regional specificity 
Cost  Product: Television sets – declining price 
over time (starting at c. $3000 in year 
2000 dollars in 1948), comparable to 
computers but higher relative median 
income in earliest years (although cheaper 
by 1960s) 
Service:  Free 
Product: Computer  – declining price 
over time (although price rises quickly 
with quality, which keeps increasing) 
 
Service: Continuing fee, rising with 
connection quality, some reduction 
with scale 
Complexity  Simple technology/ Relatively easy fit to 
radio routines 
Relatively complex technology/ less 
easly adapted to existing routines 
Versatility  Low: Single use, mass programming  Very high: Multiple uses, very diverse 
programming 
Competition  Head on with radio, cinema  Modest niche overlap with many med-
ia, head on with none 
Institutional 
Policies 
Powerful business and content model 
from radio; controlled by established rad-
io networks 
Few business models; no clear content 
models; programming highly compe-
titive with few b arriers to entry, 
especially in early years 
 DiMaggio and Cohen ---24--- 
an S -shaped diffusion curve with a steep trajectory, but (other things equal) their lack of 
specificity would tend to encourage relative intergroup equality.  
Technological infrastructure.   Different communications media distribute in-
formation in different ways, and the technology of distribution places constraints on both 
overall adoption levels and the opportunities of members of different groups.   Early 
television depended upon broadcasting by stations whose signals were largely confined 
within metropolitan limits.   In the early years, then, the effective ceiling on the U.S. tele-
vision adoption rate was the percentage of Americans living within range of a broadcast 
station, which was just over half in 1950.  By 1954, with 95 percent of the population 
with broadcast range, space was no longer a significant constraint (Bogart 1972).    
It is less easy to generalize about the Internet because of the variety of means 
through which it can be accessed.   Most Americans with telephones can access the Int-
ernet through telephone hook-ups, an arrangement that puts service within reach of the 
vast majority, but penalizes certain groups (Native Americans on rural reservations; per-
sons in low-income urban communities [Mueller and Schement 1996]).   And cell phone 
users can access the Internet wirelessly (if slowly) in most of the U.S.   (Wireless is even 
more available and considerably more popular in East Asia and Europe.)   Access to 
high-speed Internet, on the other hand, has been more vulnerable to technological limitat-
ions: DSL service, for example, is available only to consumers whose homes are relative-
ly close to originating servers; and effective cable service has been available only in com-
munities with relatively modern cable infrastructures.  Complicating matters even further, 
wealthy consumers can turn to more expensive solutions (e.g., satellite dishes in rural 
communities) unavailable to their less well-off neighbors.   Considering all this, we antic-DiMaggio and Cohen ---25--- 
ipate that region had a large effect on television adoption in the early years but that its 
effect became negligible by 1957; and that rural areas experienced a significant but 
declining disadvantage in Internet adoption.   
Cost. Early television and Internet service were both expensive, albeit in different 
ways.   The average retail price for a television set was around $400 in 1948 and fell to 
$308 by 1951 (Machlup 1962: 253; Spigel 1992: 32).   Taking account of inflation, these 
prices were roughly the equivalent in 2000 dollars of $3000 and $2200 respectively.  This 
price was similar to the cost of name-brand personal computers in the early 1990s.  Both 
costs declined, though television prices fell a little more quickly than those for comput-
ers.
3   For both television sets and computers, bargain-hunters or shoppers willing to take 
a chance on the resale market could purchase units for well under the median, and 
consumers wanting state-of-the-art devices could pay considerably more.   
There is an important difference, however, in the cost structure of television in the 
1950s and the Internet in the 1990s.   Television involved a one-time purchase: Once one 
bought a television receiver, programming was free.   By contrast, Internet service re-
quired an ongoing service charge, the price of which declined, but only modestly, in the 
early 2000s.  Moreover as the Internet developed commercially in the late 1990s, site de-
signs came to rely more heavily on detailed graphics and java applications and more uses 
emerged that entailed downloading large files.  By the end of our time series, users would 
find it difficult to access many services without high-speed DSL or cable connections that 
cost between $20 and $60 per month.    
Data on the diffusion of communications devices suggests that the presence of 
ongoing expense is a greater economic impediment to diffusion than one-time purchase DiMaggio and Cohen ---26--- 
costs, even when prices are high.   Compare, for example, the rapid diffusion of radio to 
the slow and uneven progress of telephone service which, despite a federal policy of 
universal service, took half a century to reach 90 percent penetration; or compare the 
glacial progress of cable television service to the nearly instantaneous acceptance of 
VCRs (DiMaggio et al. 2004).  Consequently, we anticipate that while income would 
represent a significant predictor of adoption for both television and the Internet in the 
earliest years, in the longer run low incomes would remain a more obdurate barrier to 
Internet access. 
  Complexity.   Of the two media, the Internet is by far the more complex, requiring 
greater skill, experience, and assistance to use effectively than television (Hargittai 2002).   
Moreover, the returns to skill in utility – that is, the difference between what an exper-
ienced and inexperienced user can obtain – is far greater for the Internet than for televis-
ion.   To be sure, the Internet has become more user-friendly over the years; and many 
Internet users restrict themselves to relatively easy-to-use services (for example, e-mail).   
Nonetheless, the difference is still very significant.   Consequently, we anticipate that 
educational attainment will be associated with Internet adoption and not with television, 
and that its influence will remain strong over time.   Moreover, although the young tend 
to be among the first to adopt most new technologies, we anticipate that the advantage of 
the young will persist longer for Internet adoption than for use of television.   
  Versatility.  The Internet provides many affordances, television only one, that of 
entertainment.  The Internet serves as an instrument of two-way communication, as well 
as a source of entertainment, news and information, and a means of shopping and acquir-DiMaggio and Cohen ---27--- 
ing education.  One might, for this reason, expect it to be widely attractive, its utility per-
haps outweighing its complexity.      
Internet programming is also far more diverse in content and perspective than 
television (though television in the early days featured more highbrow programming that 
it would in later years).  Television’s mass appeal enabled it to serve as a primary source 
of common knowledge and social membership (Neuman 1991).   By contrast, the Internet 
can sustain the identities of small, spatially dispersed communities.   Although critics 
have noted that relatively few sites specialize in offering information or services to 
Americans of color (Kolko, Nakamura and Rodman, eds., 2000), the Internet certainly 
features more culturally specific “programming” than did early television.  Thus one 
might expect weaker effects of race and ethnicity on Internet than on television adoptions.    
Institutional context. Television competed directly with radio and film.   Because 
the same networks that had dominated radio broadcasting also controlled television 
broadcasting, the succession was relatively smooth.  (Radio listenership declined as rad-
io’s function changed, and radio programming evolved accordingly, shifting from dram-
atic series and spectaculars to demographically specialized musical formats.)  Televis-
ion’s effect on film is ordinarily held to have been more devastating, with a dramatic de-
cline in cinema attendance attributed to television’s rise.   Baumann (2001), however, 
contends that the film audience had already started to decline before the expansion of the 
television audience, due to the post-war baby boom, which restricted the mobility of 
young adults newly burdened with parental duties.   The Internet, by contrast, competed 
obliquely with many sources of information and communications at once, without 
entirely supplanting any, initially at least.  The Internet’s rise has eaten into, but not yet DiMaggio and Cohen ---28--- 
devoured, the markets for postal delivery, long-distance telephone service, television, 
recorded music, and, increasingly, film.  Because of its versatility, it has not needed to 
dominate any of these niches in order to succeed.  
Government regulation of broadcasting primarily addressed the broadcast spect-
rum and the number and distribution of broadcast stations (Owen 1999).   It shaped the 
structure of the television industry, the nature of competition (and therefore of program-
ming), and the pace at which the television audience expanded.  Government policy to-
wards the Internet was more facilitative, fostering the commercialization of the medium 
after 1995 and investing in programs to ensure that schools and libraries offered Internet 
access.   Efforts to use public schools to provide Internet competency, if successful, will 
in the long run have egalitarian effects.  In the short run, however, they reinforce the ad-
vantage of the young.     
Television was supported by advertisers, who first sponsored entire programs and 
later paid rates based on the number of viewers that particular shows could command.   
Viewership research in the early years was relatively primitive, treating all viewers as 
equivalent, regardless of the economic resources at their disposal.  Consequently, incent-
ives for television producers rewarded audience expansion over niche marketing.   By 
contrast, commercial development of the Internet has concentrated on high-end consum-
ers, while noncommercial development has been driven by institutions of higher educat-
ion.   On balance, then, television’s institutional context militated towards a declining ef-
fect of socioeconomic status on adoption; whereas the Internet’s institutional context, de-
spite competing influences, has tended to reinforce the importance of education, income, 
and youth.   DiMaggio and Cohen ---29--- 
Predictions:  Given the preliminary nature of the theoretical framework and the 
inadequacy of our data, it would be premature to generate formal hypotheses.   At the 
same time, our theoretical framework facilitates an analysis that does lead to some gen-
eral expectations about the difference we would expect in the diffusion of the television 
and the Internet.   The least controversial (and most banal) prediction is that the diffusion 
of each would follow the usual S-pattern of slow start-up, rapid ascent, and eventual 
leveling off.   The Internet’s progress might be expected to be more explosive because of 
the strong network externalities associated with its use; at the same time, adoption would 
be smoothed by the variety of groups attracted by the medium’s versatility and impeded 
by the cost of Internet service.    
  At the same time, we would anticipate that the Internet’s diffusion would level off 
at a lower rate of penetration, due to the constraining effect of subscription service; and 
that the effects of income would remain significant longer than was the case for televis-
ion.   Because of the Internet’s complexity, we would anticipate that educational attain-
ment would remain a strong predictor for Internet adoption but not for television adopt-
ion; and that the advantage of the young would also persist longer for the Internet.  By 
contrast, we would anticipate a swifter effacement of the net effects of race and ethnicity 
on Internet than on television adoption, due to the more varied content on the former. 
Data 
We sought data that could capture the first few years during which television and the In-
ternet were commercialized.   We required micro-data in order to be able to plot group-
specific diffusion rates and to analyze adoption in a series of repeated cross-sections for 
each medium.   We would have preferred data that were fully comparable, but we could DiMaggio and Cohen ---30--- 
not find them.  Incomparability between data for the Internet and for television, and 
within each over time, renders our results less precise than we would like.  Nonetheless, 
the analyses, crude as they are, suffice to illustrate our theoretical argument and to reveal 
interesting features of the two cases.      
 Data on Internet access are from supplements to the Census Bureau’s Current 
Population Survey (CPS) fielded in 1994, 1997, 1998, 2000, and 2001.  These supple-
ments were sponsored by the National Telecommunications and Information Agency 
(NTIA), a bureau of the federal Commerce Department that has taken the lead in policies 
aimed at achieving universal telephone service and, during the C linton years, expanding 
access to the Internet.
4    The CPS provides data for individuals and for households.  In 
this paper we report analyses at the individual level.  Internet users are those respondents 
and household members who used the Internet either at home or outside the home. 
Data on television are from the 1949 to 1951 Surveys of Consumer Finances 
(SCF) (Economic Behavior Program 1949; 1950; 1951)
 5; and from the News Media 
Study (NMS) of 1957 (Withey and Davis 1957).
 6   SCF respondents were asked as part 
of a series of questions about purchases: “How about such large items as furniture, a re-
frigerator, radio, television set, household appliance and so on - Did you buy anything of 
this nature during the past year, [calendar year before year of survey]?  If Yes, what did 
you buy?”   Thus SCF data indicate whether respondents had purchased televisions sets 
during the previous 12 months, not whether they owned them.  They therefore underest-
imate television ownership insofar as respondents owned television sets purchased in pre-
vious years or given them by others; and overstate it insofar as respondents report pur-
chases of television sets for others (for example, parents buying units for adult children).  DiMaggio and Cohen ---31--- 
Thus these data provided suitable proxies for in-home access only in the earliest years of 
television’s diffusion, when one could assume that vast majority of people who had not 
purchased a TV set during the year of the survey were unlikely to have purchased one in 
the past.  We concluded our analyses with the 1951 SCF (which recorded purchases made 
in 1950), because by that point too many households --- 3.875 million as opposed to just 
940,000 the  year before (Rubin and Huber 1986: 142) --- owned television sets for that 
assumption to remain tenable.    
To examine the correlates of television adoption at a latter stage in its diffusion, 
we used data from the NMS, a 1957 survey on behavior and attitudes related to news me-
dia, which asked respondents “Do you ever watch television?”  These data overestimate 
household access by including respondents who watched television at the homes of relat-
ives, friends, and neighbors but did not own sets themselves.  (The effect is slight: a sur-
vey of Kansans in 1953, when television service was new to much of the state, reported 
that 14 percent of viewers watched television only outside the home [Bogart 1972], a 
figure that would have been much lower for the national population four years later.) 
  Our decision to treat the years 1948 and 1994 as starting points reflects a combin-
ation of convenience and conviction.   Although the FCC authorized commercial televis-
ion broadcasting in 1941, the war effectively halted the medium’s development.  Televis-
ion began to take off in 1948: whereas 6500 sets were manufactured in 1946 and 179,000 
in 1947, nearly one million were produced in 1948.   Although aggregate penetration was 
low (in part because there were so few stations outside of the New York area), adoption 
rose quickly thereafter, with new stations opening throughout the U.S. (slowly at first, 
and more rapidly once the FCC lifted regulatory restrictions in 1952) until 95 percent of DiMaggio and Cohen ---32--- 
Americans were within broadcast receiving range by 1954 (Bogart 1972).   By 1957, 
when the News Media Study was undertaken, television’s penetration rate had reached 
nearly 80 percent. 
  The Internet was unleashed by a combination of the gradual development of 
graphical interfaces (browsers), which first became widely available in 1993, and regul-
atory change encouraging commercialization in 1996.   In 1994, the first year from which 
CPS modem-ownership data are available, penetration was still under 4 percent.  Internet 
use began to spiral upward in 1997, with adoption leveling off between 2000 and 2001 at 
approximately 60 percent of households.
7    
  In other words, the periods 1948 to 1957 and 1994 to 2001 represent comparable 
eras in the histories of the two media.   Each medium had existed as a technical possibil-
ity with specialized noncommercial uses for more than a decade before the starting point.   
In each case, the proportion of adopters at the onset of the series was in the very low 
single digits.  For each, diffusion grew rapidly approximately three years after our 
starting date and continued throughout the period under investigation.    
Results 
Figure 2 compares the diffusion of the Internet to that of television.   In 1948, less than 
one out of every hundred households possessed a television receiver.  In 1994, 3.4 per-
cent of households used e-mail from a home computer.  Data for the Internet are from the 
Current Population Surveys.   Television data for 1950 through 1957 were assembled by 
Leo Bogart (1972) from research by A.C. Nielsen, NBC, and CBS; 1948 and 1949 data 
are from Kurian (1979). DiMaggio and Cohen ---33--- 
The two media followed rather similar paths; but television diffused more quickly 
than did the Internet, pulling ahead by year four (even before television signals became 
available in many parts of the United States, and while prices were still high), with the 
gap increasing in years five through eight.  Television’s entry into 80 percent of U.S.  











1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

























Sources: TV: Bogart 1972; Internet: NTIA 1994 (modem), 1997, 1998, 2000, 2001 
 
households by 1958 --- a degree of penetration substantially greater than that of radio 
during its first decade --- reflected not only the appeal of its programming, but also its 
relatively easy assimilation into the lifestyles of viewers who had for years followed 
many of the same programs on radio; its simplicity of use; the fact that its operation was 
effectively free, and the powerful social-membership externalities that it quickly came to 
generate (Butsch 2000).   By contrast, for all of its utility and appeal, the Internet diffused 
more slowly due to its novelty and strangeness (especially to older Americans), its com-
plexity, and the ongoing service charge.  Whether the strength and specificity of network DiMaggio and Cohen ---34--- 
externalities contributed to the rapidity of the Internet’s rise (by creating a series of little 
tipping points for separate user publics) or slowed the rise (due to the absence of network 
bridges between different user publics) cannot be discerned from these data. 
What about diffusion trajectories for different subgroups?   Figure 3 reports sub-
group Internet adoption rates for subgroups on the Internet based on analysis of individ-
ual-level CPS data; and reports constructed pseudo-adoption rates for television, based on 
SCF data for 1948 through 1950, with rates for 1957 calculated from the News Media 
Survey.   We constructed the SCF rates by adding the percentage purchasing television 
sets each year to the percentage in each subgroup that had purchased them in the previous 
years.  The assumption that television purchasers in this era did not already own a set is 
reasonable: as late as 1957, only 6 percent of households owned more than one television 
set [Bogart 1972: 13]).  This procedure exaggerates the slope of the increase from 1950 to 
1957 (more people watched television than bought television sets), but intergroup com-
parisons in each year are probably sound.   As anticipated, initial differences in television 
adoption were driven primarily by income, reflecting the high cost of television receivers 
in the early years.   By 1958, income differences had moderated, although well-to-do 
families were still surprisingly (given the lack of an ongoing service charge) more likely 
to own television sets than were the poor.  Differences between whites and nonwhites in 
television set ownership were modest in the early years, but grew somewhat over the 
course of the 1950s.   By contrast, college graduates were only slightly more likely  DiMaggio and Cohen ---35--- 
Figure 3.  Television and Internet Household Adoption Curves for Selected 
Household-Head/Respondent Sub-Groups 
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Data on television are from 1949, 1950, and 1951 Surveys of Consumer Finance (SCF) and 1957 News 
Media Survey.  SCF data refer to purchases of television sets in the previous year and penetration rates 
for 1950 and 1951 are derived by summing previous years in the series. NMS data refer to television 
viewing, not ownership.  Data on Internet are from Current Population Surveys of 1994, 1997, 1998, 
2000, and 2001 and refer to Internet use. The 1994 survey referred to ownership of “modems” rather 
than use of Internet, so also include connections to dedicated networks. 
 DiMaggio and Cohen ---36--- 
to purchase television sets than persons without college training, and this difference 
evaporated entirely by 1957. 
By contrast, and consistent with expectations, differences in Internet adoption be-
tween college graduates and persons without education beyond high school were notable 
in 1994 and remained substantial through 2001.   Similarly, income inequality in Internet 
adoption remained strong, with penetration rates starting higher and growing more quick-
ly among prosperous than among poor Americans throughout the 1990s.  Racial differ-
ences, by contrast, were somewhat smaller, but still substantial and persistent.  (For re-
view of a wider range of evidence indicating the persistence of racial, educational, and 
income inequality in Internet use see DiMaggio et al. 2004.) 
  Figure 4 explores Internet diffusion rates in more depth by providing exponent-
iated results (odds ratios) from logistic regressions of Internet use against selected inde-
pendent variables (income and dummy variables for college, postsecondary and high-
school education, male gender, white-collar occupation, student status, African-American 
racial identification and Hispanic ethnic identification).  By using controls, we are able to 
isolate more effectively the continuing effects of particular factors over this period.    
We emphasized that the complexity of a technology is likely to exacerbate differ-
ences in adoption rates based on education and, indeed, the advantage accruing to educat-
ion increased throughout this period.   College graduates were almost ten times as likely 
to be on-line as persons without high-school degrees in 1997 and nearly nine times as 
likely through 2001.  The advantages of high-school graduates and persons with less than 
four years of college were considerably less but still substantial, and constant throughout 
this period.   DiMaggio and Cohen ---37--- 








































































































































































Source: Current Population Survey.  Coefficients generated from regression of Internet connectivity on log income and 
dummy variables for college graduation, some  postsecondary, and high school education, male gender, white-collar 
occupation, student status, African-American racial and Hispanic ethnic identification, and metropolitan residence. DiMaggio and Cohen ---38--- 
 We also argued that the existence of continuing service costs would render in-
come inequality persistent. The impact of income was less in the 1997 than in the 1994 
model (probably because income has less of an effect on Internet use than on owning a 
modem), but increased monotonically from that point on.   The advantages of white-  
collar workers and students as opposed to persons with other employment statuses fluctu-
ated during this period, but remained substantial.   
Gender inequality in Internet use disappeared (by 2001 women were more likely 
to be on-line than comparable men).  By contrast the disadvantages associated with being 
African-American remained constant and those associated with being Hispanic increased.   
These results probably reflect the specificity of Internet externalities and the degree of 
social separation between networks of English-speaking whites and those of African-
Americans and Hispanic Americans, respectively..        
  It may be useful to focus in greater depth on the impact of various factors on ad-
option at different points in the diffusion process.   Rather than exaggerate the degree to 
which our data sets are comparable by using the same models throughout, we acknowl-
edge the exploratory nature of this enterprise and use different predictors based on their 
availability in different data sets.  (This means that our results are only loosely compar-
able, but given differences in measurement of the dependent variables, this would be the 
case even if we had used the same models.)   
  Table 3 reports predictors of television purchase in surveys from 1948, 1949, and 
1950, in which years 1.5, 6.3, and 15.0 percent of respondents (respectively) reported 
buying a set.   Table 4, reports predictors of television viewing in 1957, when penetration 
was close to 80 percent.   In the early period, the importance of infrastructure was para-DiMaggio and Cohen ---39--- 
mount, with metropolitan residence a highly significant predictor of television ownership.   
By 1957, with 519 television stations operating (compared to just over 100 in 1951), met-
ropolitan residence mattered much less.    
Income was also an important predictor of television purchases between 1949 and 
1951, not surprisingly given the high cost relative median income.  More surprisingly, in-
come remained an important predictor of ownership in 1957 (by which time television 
had reached majorities of all but the poorest Americans).  Families with children were 
particularly likely to purchase television sets (although the effect of additional children 
turned negative as families grew in size).   This may reflect some combination of three 
factors: the role of older children as lobbyists for the new technology; the utility of  tele- 
  
Table 3. Logistic Regression Models of TV Purchase, 1948 to 1950 
(Survey of Consumer Finances) 
Year  1948  1949  1950 
Metropolitan  4.7369  ***  1.6356  5.6576  ***  0.9737  3.6123  ***  0.4125 
Male  3.1528     3.2611  1.8933     0.8129  2.5791  **  0.8142 
White  0.8084     0.6230  2.2661     1.2050  1.5105     0.4507 
Married  NA        1.8350    0.5899  1.8900  **  0.4445 
Age  0.9900     0.0167  0.9947     0.0072  0.9998     0.0050 
Income (logged)  2.5070  ***  0.5738  1.9535  ***  0.2707  1.6903  ***  0.1580 
White Collar  1.9051     0.7518  0.9577     0.1701  1.1879     0.1526 
Unemployed  ELIM        0.5545     0.2952  0.6593     0.4011 
Retired  ELIM        0.2818  **  0.1348  1.1097     0.3385 
Number of Children  1.7889  **  0.3686  1.3384  **  0.1377  1.2051  **  0.0851 
Children
 squared  0.8439  *  0.0727  0.9401     0.0359  0.9398  *  0.0250 
High School  0.5729     0.2439  1.0822     0.2156  1.2885    0.1864 
College  0.6744     0.3063  0.7395     0.1841  1.0121     0.1817 
N  2,733       3,408       3,315     
Pseudo R-Squared  18.78%        19.11%        14.72%       
Coefficients reported in odds-ratios; standard errors in italics 
***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05, 
Individual characteristics pertain to household head, not respondent; ELIM=Eliminated from analysis 
because predicts outcome perfectly; NA = Not Available 
   
vision as a babysitter; and the desire of parents of small children for substitute entertain-
ment given their inability to seek entertainment outside the home as frequently as when DiMaggio and Cohen ---40--- 
they were childless.  (Baughman[1992] and Baumann [2001] note that movie attendance 
began to plummet at the start of the post-war baby boom, before the rise of television.)  
By 1957 television was firmly established in American households, with or with-
out children.  Television in the early years was an intensely social medium.   In the 
1940s, it was primarily watched in bars, which used television sets as a means to attract 
patrons.  Once it moved into the home, the living rooms of early adopters often attracted 
neighbors and friends to showing of favorite programs (Butsch 2000).   Consistent with  
Table 4.  Logistic Regression Models of 
TV Viewership, 1957 (News Media Study) 
Metropolitan  1.7241  **  0.3092 
Male  0.9346     0.1653 
White   2.8462  ***  0.6686 
Age  0.9780  **  0.0069 
Married  1.4000     0.2828 
Income (logged)  2.1017  ***  0.2378 
White Collar  0.8895     0.2169 
Unemployed  0.9185     0.4302 
Student  0.3804     0.4628 
Retired  0.8962     0.2576 
Number of Children  0.9391     0.0502 
Number of Group Affiliations  1.5286  ***  0.1563 
Church Attendance  0.8667     0.1519 
High School  1.9219  *  0.5836 
Some College  0.7917     0.2581 
College  0.5413     0.2168 
N  1,688       
Pseudo R-Squared  21.56%       
Coefficients reported in odds-ratios 
Standard errors in italics 
***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05 
 
the notion that television viewing represented a form of social membership, television 
ownership was significantly associated by 1957 with memberships in lodges and clubs.  
(Interestingly, this did not apply to membership in churches, which may have discour-
aged television viewing.) DiMaggio and Cohen ---41--- 
Our analysis of the NMS data suggests that in 1957 no one was excluded from the 
circle of television but the poor (who still could not afford sets), the elderly (who may 
have rejected the new technology), and African-Americans (who possessed little wealth 
and who appeared rarely and unflatteringly in TV programming [Baughmann 1992: 56 ).  
Many college graduates excluded themselves, as the negative coefficient indicates, per-
haps viewing television’s embrace by the mass public as a kind of negative externality 
(Steiner 1963:33-34; 57-58)  .  (The proportion of college graduates who watched televis-
ion was high, just not as high as one would have expected given the fact that they earned 
high incomes, were disproportionately white, and joined lots of associations.) 
Table 5 provides a more detailed view of factors predicting Internet adoption from 
1994 through 2001, adding additional covariates to the simpler model that generated the 
exponentiated coefficients reported in Figure 4.   The exponentiated logit coefficients 
represent net differences in odds of adoption associated with particular characteristics or 
identities.   Values greater than 1 indicate a positive impact on adoption, whereas values 
lower than 1 indicate the opposite.    
College graduates maintained a very strong advantage (and one that grows 
relative high-school graduates) over this period.   Similarly, the impact of income in-
creased between 1997 and 2000.  White-collar employees and students maintained a 
sizable advantage over other groups (with blue-collar workers the omitted category).
8    
Perhaps reflecting the importance of local networks, modest regional disparities 
have persisted, with the midwest and southeast falling behind as the northeast has caught 
up with the west.   The development of technological infrastructure reduced the initial 
advantage of center-city residents, which disappeared by 2000.   Suburbanites maintained  
Table 5. Logistic Regression Models of Internet Adoption, 1994 to 2001 (Current Population Survey) 
Year  1994  1997  1998  2000  2001 
Dependent Variable  Modem Ownership  Internet Use  Internet Use  Internet Use  Internet Use 
Metro Central  1.4159  ***  0.0510  1.2573  ***  0.0395  1.1785  ***  0.0332  1.0861  **  0.0307  1.0350     0.0279 
Metro Other  1.5232  ***  0.0472  1.1536  ***  0.0319  1.0599  *  0.0260  1.1031  ***  0.0269  1.1108  ***  0.0257 
Income (logged)  1.9187  ***  0.0444  1.4507  ***  0.0259  1.4692  ***  0.0242  1.6189  ***  0.0261  1.6773  ***  0.0250 
Income (top code)  1.2542  ***  0.0418  1.1711  ***  0.0348  1.2385  ***  0.0346  1.1693  ***  0.0332  1.1789  ***  0.0330 
White Collar  1.3608  ***  0.0373  2.8091  ***  0.0709  2.3336  ***  0.0503  2.2500  ***  0.0483  2.9188  ***  0.0620 
Student  1.8504  ***  0.0996  7.8607  ***  0.3695  3.7431  ***  0.1702  2.6677  ***  0.1610  4.9673  ***  0.2794 
Unemployed  1.2392  **  0.0927  1.1291     0.0875  1.3784  ***  0.0816  1.4895  ***  0.0812  1.4086  ***  0.0684 
Retired  0.7617  ***  0.0437  0.6563  ***  0.0394  0.7683  ***  0.0344  0.8767  **  0.0345  0.8853  **  0.0313 
Disabled  0.9386     0.0921  0.5846  ***  0.0615  0.8037  **  0.0546  0.7904  ***  0.0444  0.7098  ***  0.0346 
Number of Children  NA        NA        NA        1.0301  **  0.0101  1.0423  ***  0.0100 
Age  0.9860  ***  0.0010  0.9744  ***  0.0009  0.9686  ***  0.0008  0.9631  ***  0.0008  0.9633  ***  0.0008 
High School  1.6845  ***  0.0951  2.5561  ***  0.1494  2.2518  ***  0.0907  2.3250  ***  0.0818  2.3295  ***  0.0713 
Post-Secondary  2.7585  ***  0.1541  5.5152  ***  0.3151  4.5249  ***  0.1807  4.8582  ***  0.1745  4.7952  ***  0.1524 
College or More  4.2000  ***  0.2404  9.9811  ***  0.5856  8.6454  ***  0.3647  9.5477  ***  0.3725  9.6163  ***  0.3446 
Married  1.3674  ***  0.0363  1.1211  ***  0.0263  1.0669  *  0.0224  1.1438  ***  0.0252  1.2714  ***  0.0264 
Male  1.1006  ***  0.0238  1.4144  ***  0.0284  1.1965  ***  0.0218  0.9756     0.0180  0.9329  ***  0.0166 
African-American  0.5360  ***  0.0281  0.5617  ***  0.0237  0.5058  ***  0.0182  0.4737  ***  0.0158  0.4768  ***  0.0151 
Asian-American  0.9955     0.0543  0.7231  ***  0.0367  0.5851  ***  0.0275  0.5356  ***  0.0250  0.5576  ***  0.0256 
Hispanic  0.5378  ***  0.0321  0.5181  ***  0.0245  0.4544  ***  0.0176  0.3833  ***  0.0132  0.3592  ***  0.0117 
Mid-West  1.0975  **  0.0347  1.0390     0.0310  1.0196     0.0276  0.9786     0.0269  0.9360  *  0.0244 
South  1.1047  **  0.0335  1.1103  ***  0.0321  0.9839     0.0256  0.9407  *  0.0249  0.8691  ***  0.0221 
West  1.3737  ***  0.0427  1.3381  ***  0.0397  1.2982  ***  0.0351  1.2188  ***  0.0337  1.0632  *  0.0281 
N  88,662        79,202        77,583        75,380        88,426       
Pseudo R-Squared  16.03%        25.94%        25.54%        28.64%        32.40%       
Coefficients reported in odds-ratios, standard errors in italics.   
***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05; NA=variable not available in set 
Coefficient estimates for variable demarcating unidentified metropolitan region omitted. 
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a small edge over people living outside metropolitan areas, perhaps reflecting network 
externalities in the use of the Internet by schools and community organizations, or in-
creasing use of superior suburban cable infrastructure for high-speed Internet access.  
As was the case for television in 1957, youth was associated with Internet use 
throughout this period with little change from year to year, a difference that reflected the 
greater openness of the young to new technology, their greater familiarity with comput-
ers, and the premium placed upon the Internet by high schools (especially in the informal 
student culture) and, even more so, institutions of higher education.   Indeed, the emerg-
ing reliance of high-school and college students on instant messaging represents as pure a 
network-externality effect as one can find.
9   Even controlling for age, full-time students 
maintained a substantial advantage over other labor-force-status categories. 
Finally, as was the case for television in the early years, married people and par-
ents were significantly more likely to use the Internet than were people without children.  
(Moreover, results not reported here demonstrated that, as was also the case for televis-
ion, the positive impact of children declines as the number of children grows.)   The at-
tractiveness of the medium to older children, its perceived educational value, and its use-
fulness in managing children’s school and social lives probably share responsibility for 
this finding. 
The relative  position of Hispanics appears to have deteriorated over time; and 
African-Americans remain only about half as likely as similar whites to use the Internet 
throughout this period.   Surprisingly, despite high absolute rates of Internet use, Asian-
Americans used the Internet less than sociodemographically similar Euro-Americans.
10   DiMaggio and Cohen ---44--- 
Note that the Internet’s relative content diversity would lead one to expect that 
Internet usage patterns for members of racial and ethnic minority groups would differ less 
from those of whites compared to television in the 1950s.   At the same time, however, 
insofar as members of these groups are socially isolated as well as (in the case of Hisp-
anics and African-Americans) economically disadvantaged, the networks in which they 
participate may be expected to have adopted the Internet more slowly than television due 
to the greater role of pure network effects in the diffusion of the former.   In so far as net-
work effects matter, we would expect that members of minority groups with character-
istics like high levels of formal education or white-collar employment that are associated 
with lower levels of social isolation will adopt at a higher rate, relative whites, than peop-
le with less education or lower-status occupations.    
We explored this possibility by adding two sets of interaction effects to the mod-
els reported in Table 5.
11   In one set of models we included interactions of the three 
educational levels with the three racial and ethnic identities.   In a second set of models  
Table 6: Race/Ethnicity Interaction Effects on Internet Use 
Interactions  1994  1997  1998  2000  2001 
BlackXHS  1.018  1.071    1.350          1.053  0.846 
BlackX some college  0.983       1.607*       1.603**       1.167  0.953 
Black X college    1.442  1.914**  2.004***     1.412**    1.129 
Asian-American XHS  0.396***  0.959    0.912  1.260        0.802 
Asian-Am. X some col.  0.492**  0.920         1.194  1.585*  0.869      
Asian-Am. X college  0.557**   1.205  1.328         1.408        0.946       
Hispanic X HS  1.331  1.680*   2.221***       1.858***  1.327*** 
Hispanic X some college  1.823**     2.466***    2.658***  2.138***  1.458*** 
Hispanic X college  2.438***    2.518***  2.522***     2.166***  1.471***     
Black X white-collar  1.270*           1.528***        1.506***  1.296***        1.281*** 
Asian-Am. X white-collar  0.811*  0.880            1.034  1.223*           0.948 
Hispanic X white-collar  1.620***         1.428***  1.421***  1.544***        1.384*** 
*** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05; two tailed 
Education interactions and occupation interactions added (in separate models) to basic model predicting 
use of the Internet at any location from Table 5.  Figures are exponentiated logistic regression coefficients, 
with values >1 representing smaller differences from white rates for group members with the indicated 
trait than for the group as a whole. 1994 data are for modem in the home. 
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we included interactions of the latter with white-collar employment.   The exponentiated 
logistic regression coefficients in Table 6 represent the extent to which adoption rates dif-
fer less (for values greater than 1) or more (for values less than 1) from the white rates for 
group members with the indicated characteristic than for other group members.   
  For African-American and Hispanic respondents, the results are consistent with 
the proposition, based on the network-externalities framework, that group-specific adopt-
ion rates are retarded by social isolation.   For Blacks, white-collar employment appears 
to be especially important, although in most years African-American college graduates 
differ less from their white counterparts than do less educated African-Americans.  For 
Hispanics, occupational status and educational attainment both have large effects, with 
higher education substantially reducing inequality, and even high school graduation hav-
ing a strongly beneficial effect.  Educational effects for both African-Americans and His-
panics, and occupational effects for Blacks, have tended to decline over time, perhaps re-
flecting within-group diffusion to less elite networks.   
By contrast, neither education nor occupation has a consistent impact on net dif-
ferences between Asian-American and Euro-American rates of use.   We have no way of 
knowing whether this reflects the relatively small size of the Asian-American samples 
(especially given the heterogeneity of this population) or something distinctive about pat-
terns of Internet diffusion in Asian-American communities.   Although the results certain-
ly do not support a network-externalities interpretation, neither do they in themselves dis-
confirm it.   (From a network perspective, we would expect such results if Internet use 
had been high enough within homophilous Asian-American networks that contact with 
outsiders was unnecessary to stimulate diffusion; or if white-collar employment and high-DiMaggio and Cohen ---46--- 
er education had less of an impact on outgroup contact for Asian-Americans than for 
African-Americans or Americans of Hispanic descent due to strong enclave economies.) 
For the most part these findings are consistent with the six predictions that em-
erged from our comparison of television and the Internet in the light of our analytic 
framework.   First, as predicted, Internet and television diffusion both roughly fit the ex-
pected logistic pattern, with the former leveling of earlier than the latter.   Second, also as 
predicted, regional effects on television were stronger than on the Internet, whereas rur-
al/metropolitan differences were important for the Internet, and both declined in import-
ance over time.    Third, as predicted, income had a significant effect on the adoption of 
both television and the Internet and persisted in its effects on Internet adoption; but its 
effects on television adoption declined less quickly than we anticipated.    Fourth, as an-
ticipated, both age and, especially, educational attainment were more strongly associated 
with Internet than with television adoption, especially after the first few years.   Fifth, 
contrary to expectations based on content versatility, but consistent with rough intuitions 
about social homophily and network effects on adoption, racial and ethnic effects on In-
ternet adoption remained strong.   Finally, as noted and with some exceptions, sociodem-
ographic factors have tended to have more persistent effects on Internet adoption than on 
television adoption, a finding also consistent with the framework developed earlier.   
Conclusion 
 
The development of capitalism over the past two centuries has been marked by growing 
interdependence of markets and consumption.   From the autarchy of agricultural com-
munities through the small-scale production of early capitalism; from the emergence of 
the factory system, which ushered in mass production, economies of scale and, ultimate-DiMaggio and Cohen ---47--- 
ly, mass consumption, to the rise of flexible production and the use of consumption as a 
means of defining shared identities as well as satisfying needs, goods and services with 
network externalities have played an increasingly important role in both economy and 
society.   When the economist Fritz Machlup (1962) first called attention to the growing 
importance of the United States’s information economy, with its strong network propert-
ies, almost half a century ago, he could not have imagined the extent to which the Internet 
revolution of the 1990 (in combination with the loss of most of the traditional manufact-
uring sector) would bring his vision to fruition.    
  In this paper we have tried to accomplish three things.  First, like the other authors 
in this volume, we have exploited insights from the field of economics, specifically the 
notion of “network externalities.”  And, like others, we have prodded and stretched as we 
have borrowed, rendering the concept more sociological in three ways: calling explicit at-
tention to social-network externalities that are as real in their consequences as purely in-
strumental effects; making a case for treating “network-ness” as a continuous variable 
rather than a binary classification; and distinguishing between two correlated but analyt-
ically independent dimensions of variation in network goods (the degree to which their 
use entails social interaction and the extent to which users care about the specific identit-
ies of other consumers).    
  Second, we have developed a systematic analytic framework for understanding 
differences in the diffusion patterns of new technologies, especially new technologies of 
information and communications with at least some of the properties of network goods.   
In particular, we are interested in explaining the rate of diffusion, the extent of diffusion, 
and the degree of socioeconomic inequality in adoption over the course of the diffusion DiMaggio and Cohen ---48--- 
process.  The framework described in this chapter should be useful both for comparing 
the trajectories of different technologies within societies and for comparing the traject-
ories of similar technologies across different societies.  
  Third, we have illustrated the utility of this framework in the context of a compar-
ison between the diffusion of television between 1948 and 1957 and the diffusion of the 
Internet between 1994 and 2001, both in the United States.   Each of these media was 
enormously successful in its first years; each was initially constrained by spatial factors 
that became less important as the technological infrastructure developed; and each ap-
pealed especially to young people and their parents.   Yet there were also significant dif-
ferences that are explicable with reference to the analytic framework presented here, esp-
ecially the lower level at which Internet penetration began to plateau and the persistence 
of socioeconomic inequality in its distribution.   This analysis also demonstrates the ut-
ility of our framework for policy-analytic purposes by answering a question that has been 
a source of much contestation in the communications-policy field: The “digital divide” is 
not simply developmental, but is likely to persist indefinitely, at least in the absence of 
concerted public action.    
  The analyses presented here, both theoretical and empirical, are preliminary and 
crude.  The theoretical framework needs further development, ideally with the use of 
computational models to illuminate the less intuitively obvious implications of different 
forms of social-network externalities.  And the empirical analyses would benefit from the 
application of better data to more technologies in cross-national perspective.   Joining 
with this volume’s other authors in the attempt to integrate insights from economics and 
sociology in order to better understand the capitalist economies of the 21
st century, we DiMaggio and Cohen ---49--- 
hope that we have provided a start to the comparative analysis of goods and services 
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Endnotes 
                                                 
1 Economists use the term “externality” to refer to positive or negative consequences of 
the production or consumption of a good or service that are not captured by or charged to 
the producer or consumer.  The particular class of externality upon which we focus in this 
paper comprises cases in which one person’s consumption of a service generates utilities 
from which other consumers benefit.   
2Some economists have modeled the influence of social relations on consumer decision-
making (e.g., Leibenstein 1950; Akerlof 1997), but of the ones we have seen, only Shy 
(2001: ch. 10) does so in the context of network externalities.      
3 The SCF asked respondents the price they paid for their television set by dollar ranges.  
Taking the median of these ranges for each year yields estimates ($425 for 1948 and 
1949; $325 for 1950 for the median categories), similar to estimates based on retail 
surveys.    
4In this paper we report analyses at the individual level, although the dependent variable 
in 1994 (modem ownership) can be interpreted as household connectivity. In 1994, 
respondents were asked if their household owned a modem attached to a telephone line, 
whereas from 1997 on the question referred to Internet service.  Therefore, the 1994 data 
underestimate Internet use insofar as some respondents may have used a modem they did 
not own, and overestimates insofar as some respondents used modems to connect to 
dedicated networks that were not part of the Internet.  Individual-level and household-
level results for Internet penetration differ because some members of households with 
Internet connections do not use the Internet and because many people without household 
connections go on-line at school or work (DiMaggio et al. 2004).  Coding Notes for DiMaggio and Cohen ---57--- 
                                                                                                                                                 
Current Population Survey.  Metropolitan Status.  The distinction between central and 
non-central areas of metropolitan areas is crucial to studies on Internet access inequality.  
However, the CPS variable that delineates central versus non-central areas of metropol-
itan regions (gtmsast) often has many missing values.  The difficulty with this identific-
ation problem affects a large proportion of the data set (around 15% of respondents or 
more).  To avoid losing too much data, the following strategy was used.  First, within 
descriptive statistics, graphs and tables depicting metropolitan respondents do not dif-
ferentiate between central and non-central residents (which allows us to use the gemetsta 
variable, for which there are substantially fewer missing values).  However, within the 
regressions, members of unidentified groups were placed in a residual category, the 
coefficient of which is not reported in the tables of coefficients.  Occupational Group-
ings.  Occupational groupings (students, white- and blue-collar workers, unemployed, 
disabled and retired individuals) were placed into mutually exclusive categories.  White-
collar and blue-collar workers were categorized as such only if they were in the labor 
force at the time of the survey and did not claim to be full-time students or retirees.  
Disabled people in the labor force were included in the white- and blue-collar categories.  
Students are restricted to respondents who either (1) reported being full-time students 
who were not in summer vacation in the week prior to the survey, or (2) claimed to not be 
in the labor force because they were students.  The use of these criteria is an artifact of 
the way the CPS assesses student status.  Full-time students who claimed to have full-
time jobs were placed in the student category, while part-time students were all placed 
within other occupational categories.  Disabled individuals only include those who were 
not in the labor force during the survey.  Respondents are categorized as retired if they DiMaggio and Cohen ---58--- 
                                                                                                                                                 
report being simultaneously not in the labor force as a result of being retired and report 
having a profession.  Education.  Education is grouped into four categories: (1) less than 
a high school degree, (2) completed a high school degree (including GED), (3) some 
postsecondary schooling and (4) completion of a college degree or more.  Children.  
People who were coded as having missing values for number of children are described as 
not being parents, and thus were assigned zero children for this variable.  This variable 
was only available after 1999.  Age.  Respondents who were top coded at age 90 were 
represented as being 90 in the data set.  Income.  Respondents who were top coded at an 
annual income of $75,000 or more were coded as having incomes of $100,000 in the data 
set.  Modem Ownership.  Many observations in the modem ownership variable (hesq2) 
were coded as blank.  Those who were coded as having a computer (from hesq1) and 
were left blank in hesq2 were classified as not having a modem. 
5Coding Notes for Survey of Consumer Finances.  Survey years correspond to responses 
given one year earlier.  The number-of-children variable was top coded at 7 and recorded 
as 7.5 children for the1949 and 1950 surveys, and top coded and coded at 9 in 1951.  Age 
was top coded at 65 and recorded at 70.  In the 1949 survey, income was top coded at 
$99,995 and recorded as $100,000.  In all years, one dollar was added to the income to 
define its log when income equalled zero.  In 1950, the top code was $200,000 and coded 
as such.  The incidence of income top coding was extremely rare.  The 1949 survey 
lacked information on marital status.  Occupational categories refer to the household 
head.  White-collar workers include professionals, technical workers, self-employed, art-
isans, managers, clerical and sales workers.  For the 1950 and 1951 surveys, the high 
school and college variables appear to include those who completed some high school or DiMaggio and Cohen ---59--- 
                                                                                                                                                 
college, respectively.  The codebook is not completely clear.  The 1949 survey explicitly 
refers to completion of high school and college.  Documentation does not specify whether 
the race variable refers to the respondent or to the household head in the 1950 and 1951 
surveys, but it was assumed to refer to the household head. 
6 Coding Notes for News Media Survey.  Respondents top coded at 65 years of age or 
over were assigned an age of 70.  Those who were top coded as having 9 or more 
children were coded as having 9 children, and those who reported having 9 or more group 
affiliations were coded as having 9 group affiliations.  Respondents were coded as attend-
ing religious services if they reported going to services more than “two or three times per 
month” or “regularly.”  This data set top coded income at “$20,000 or over” which was 
converted into $32,000 (which corresponds to $200,000 in 2000 dollars).  Occupational 
codes are similar to those in the Survey of Consumer Finances.  High School only 
includes those who completed high school. 
7 Hanneymyr (2003) places the inception dates at 1945 (when commercial development 
resumed after being suspended during the 2
nd World War) for television and at 1989 
(when the first commercial ISPs opened their virtual doors) for the Internet.   This 
approach is reasonable, but given our focus on long-term diffusion trends, little is lost by 
setting the date later.  Despite the differing chronology, we concur with Hanneymyr’s 
main conclusion – that television and the Internet diffused at similar rates.  
8 The results for the unemployed appear anomalous but are explicable as follows:  On 
average, the unemployed are less likely to connect to the Internet.  But they also have a 
high incidence of other factors associated with low rates of connectivity  – low incomes, 
non-white race, Hispanic ethnicity, rural residence, lower educational attainment, DiMaggio and Cohen ---60--- 
                                                                                                                                                 
residence in the South.  Detailed analyses found that unemployment coefficient estimates 
were sensitive to the inclusion of white-collared workers and students, and income in 
most years.  The unemployed tend to have very low incomes, but may go online more 
than others with equally low incomes because they have more free time and special 
incentive to seek work on the Internet.  The effect of unemployment also showed some 
sensitivity to educational levels, but not to race or ethnicity. 
9 A fall 2002 study revealed that well over 90 percent of Princeton University freshman 
used instant messaging and most preferred it to e-mail or telephones for coordinating 
activities, as well as for staying in touch with old friends (Schrader 2003). 
10 Because previous studies have shown such high rates of Internet use for Asian-
Americans, we subjected this finding to particularly close scrutiny.  In every year, Asian-
Americans had higher absolute rates of connectivity than Euro-Americans, African-
Americans, or Hispanics.  But Asian-American CPS respondents also had very high 
average levels of the strongest predictors of Internet use, including income, white-collar 
employment, full-time student status, college-degree attainment, non-central metropolitan 
and western regional residence.  Including these variables in the models reduced Asian-
Americans’ zero-order advantage to the negative coefficients visible in Table 5.   
11 We thank Victor Nee for suggesting this strategy. 